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INTRODUCTION

T

ITLE IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments' (CAAA)
contains a promising, but untested, approach for distributing
the social and economic costs of acid rain control among the
t International President, United Mine Workers of America. B.S., 1971,
Pennsylvania State University; J.D., 1974, Villanova University School of Law.
1. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 7651-7651o (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).

(247)
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states and sources contributing sulfur and nitrogen oxide emissions to the atmosphere. Incorporating a system of marketable
emission "allowances" for sulfur dioxide (S02) emissions with incentives for the early use of emission control technologies, Title
IV centralizes regulatory control of emission allowance transactions at the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), but provides individual states and polluters broad discretion in the choice of emission reduction compliance options.
The emission allowance trading program proposed by the
Bush Administration in June 1989 engrafted market-based incentives for pollution control onto the traditional command-and-control regulatory framework of the Clean Air Act. The
Administration's proposal for a two-phase reduction of ten million annual tons of S02 emissions was modified in the course of
congressional deliberations over the 1990 CAAA. Both the
United States Senate and House of Representatives added provisions to the Clean Air Act to ensure a more equitable distribution
of control costs among the regions affected by the program.
These amendments were intended to avoid undue disruption of
national coal markets as electric utilities comply with Title IV, to
moderate the effect of acid rain compliance costs on utility ratepayers, and to provide a margin for future economic growth in
2
states assigned relatively few emission allowances.
The "Byrd-Bond Amendment" to the Senate bill, approved
by the House-Senate conference committee, created a reserve of
3.5 million tons of S02 emission allowances available to utilities
that employ emission control technologies during Phase I of the
pollution reduction program. 4 Phase I of Title IV targets 111
fossil-fired power plants for emissions reductions by January 1,
1995. The incentives for technological controls added to Title
IV through the Byrd-Bond Amendment should serve to concentrate Phase I emission reductions at a smaller number of sources
with relatively cost-effective opportunities, avoiding the need to
reduce emissions at all 111 targeted plants. 5 Control costs at
these sources can later be recouped in part by the sale of emission
2. See generally, infra section II.
3. S. 1234, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
4. For a description of the development and purpose of the Byrd-Bond
Amendment, see U.S. Senator Robert C. Byrd, The Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990: An Innovative, But UncertainApproach to Acid Rain Control, 93 W. VA. L. REV.
477 (1991) [hereinafter U.S. Senator Robert C. Byrd, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990].

5. Id.
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allowances to plants with higher emission reduction costs. This
deferred cost-sharing, as well as other economic efficiencies
claimed for the emission allowance program, will result only if a
robust market for emission allowances develops as envisioned by
6
the architects of the Title IV program.
This article describes the legislative antecedents of Title IV's
provisions for deferred cost-sharing, and assesses early federal
and state regulatory experience with the technology incentive
provisions added by the Byrd-Bond Amendment. The additional
emission allowances available for the use of technological emission controls during Phase I already have led state public regulatory commissions to encourage utilities affected by Phase I to
employ retrofit flue gas "scrubber" technologies 7 in lieu of fuelswitching. By focusing Phase I emission reductions on large
baseload plants, the incentives for early use of control technology
added by the Byrd-Bond Amendment will reduce the socioeconomic impacts of job losses in the coal mining industry and the
8
regional economies it supports.
A.

Legislative Antecedents of Deferred Cost-Sharing

Enactment of a national acid rain control program required a
full decade of congressional debate. Senator George J. Mitchell
(D-ME) introduced the first major acid rain control bill in 1981. 9
The original Mitchell bill required a ten million ton annual reduction of S02 emissions from 1980 levels to be achieved within ten
6. See Clean Air Act Reauthorization:Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy and
Power of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. ser. 101114, pt. 1, at 5 (1989) [hereinafter Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy and
Power]:
We managed to keep the costs down by relying on a system of market
incentives. One of the truly innovative parts of this legislation, I believe, is its commitment to the free market.
We want to build on the best strengths of that market to try and get
the gains in the most cost effective way. We believe the cost of doing it
that way will be to reduce the costs of acid rain cleanup by about 20%,
or roughly [one] billion [dollars] a year.
Id. (testimony of William K. Reilly, Administrator, EPA).
7. "Scrubbers" or "retrofitting scrubbers" are pollution control devices
used in the process of desulfurization.
8. Estimates prepared for EPA indicate that, under Phase I of the Administration's acid rain proposal, the two-year time extension and two-to-one bonus
allowance provisions of the Byrd-Bond Amendment would reduce expected coal
production losses in the Midwest and northern Appalachia from 50-70 million
tons in 1996-98 to 35-60 million tons. Memorandum from Bruce Braine, Dina
Kruger & Richard Stuebi, ICF Resources, Inc., to Rob Brenner, EPA at Table 2
(Nov. 30, 1989) (on file with author) [hereinafter Nov. 30, 1989 Memorandum].
9. S. 1706, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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years of enactment. Emission reductions were allocated among
thirty-one eastern states based on each state's contribution to
1980 electric utility S02 emissions in excess of 1.2 pounds of
S02 per million British Thermal Units (BTU) of heat input.' 0
Senator Mitchell's "excess emissions" formula was copied in
dozens of acid rain control bills introduced in Congress during
the 1980's."t Industries and states assigned large emission reduction requirements under these proposals were able to prevent
their enactment by drawing attention to their high social and economic costs, and the apparent inequities of the excess emissions
allocation formula. For example, the states of Kentucky and New
York each emitted roughly one million tons of S02 in 1980.12
However, under an excess emissions allocation formula, New
York would need to reduce its S02 emissions by twenty-one percent while Kentucky would have to cut its emissions by more than
sixty percent. 13 The emission allowance program established by
Title IV of the 1990 CAAA is based, in principle, upon an excess
emissions allocation of 2.5 pounds of S02 per million BTU in
Phase I, and 1.2 pounds of S02 per million BTU in Phase II. 14
The disproportionate impact of electric utility "excess emissions" allocations results from differences in statewide average
S02 emission rates and the geographic distribution of industries
nationwide. For example, a major part of New York's S02 emissions in 1980 came from the industrial sector, and its electric utility emission rate in pounds of S02 per million BTU was lower
10. Id.
11. See E. YANARELLA & R. IHARA, THE ACID RAIN DEBATE - SCIENTIFIC, EcoNOMIC AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS (1985) [hereinafter YANARELLA & IHARA, ACID
RAIN DEBATE].
12. Id. at 222, Table 8.1.
13. Id. at 141, Table 6.3. If all 31 eastern states were required to reduce
total emissions of sulfur dioxide (S02) by a uniform percent reduction to
achieve a 10 million ton annual reduction of S02 emissions below 1980 levels,
each state would reduce emissions by 44%. Id.
14. Section 404(a) of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) requires that after Jan. 1, 1995, emissions at 111 specific power plants not exceed
the S02 allowances stated in Table A of that section. 42 U.S.C.S. § 7651c(a)
(Law. Co-op Supp. 1991). Phase I emission limits are determined by multiplying
each unit's 1985-87 baseline heat input in British Thermal Units (BTU) by an
emissions rate equal to 2.5 pounds of S02 per million BTU, divided by 2000. 42
U.S.C.S. § 7651c(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991). Section 405 establishes Phase
II emission limits. Phase II limits affect all generating units larger than 75 megawatts capacity. After January 1, 2000, all such units are limited to emission allowances equal to the product of the unit's 1985-87 baseline heat input
multiplied by 1.2 pounds of S02 per million BTU, divided by 2000. 42 U.S.C.S.
§ 7651d(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
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than Kentucky's emission rate.' 5 In theory, any state with a high
proportion of S02 emissions concentrated in the industrial sector, or with electric utility emissions below a rate of 1.2 pounds of
S02 per million BTU, could largely escape regulation under an
excess emissions allocation formula regardless of the total tons of
6
S02 emitted within the state.'
Congressional advocates of the excess emissions approach
argued that "clean" states in the Northeast and West which had
already cleaned up their emissions should not bear the same control burden as "dirty" states in the Midwest and Southeast with
higher emission rates. The "clean state/dirty state" dichotomy
defined the entire course of the acid rain control debate,' 7 and
prevented acid rain control legislation from reaching a floor vote
in either house of Congress for a decade. Interregional cost-sharing proposals were developed early in the debate in an effort to
reduce the social and economic impacts of acid rain control legislation on high-emitting states.
The objective of interregional cost-sharing is to require relatively clean states to share part of the control costs of high-emitting states without further reducing their own emissions. Costsharing also protects the employment of tens of thousands of
eastern coal miners and the regional economies dependent on the
high-sulfur coal industry.' 8 By collecting fees or taxes through a
national acid rain control trust fund or similar device, funds could
be disbursed to defray the costs of installing pollution control devices, such as flue gas desulfurization "scrubbers" at midwestern
power plants targeted for large emission reductions. Targeting
these plants for emission controls, with a national trust fund to
cover a portion of their control costs, would serve the dual objectives of minimizing electric rate increases for industry and con15. See YANARELLA & IHARA, ACID RAIN DEBATE, supra note 11.
16. See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ACID RAIN
AND TRANSPORTED AIR POLLUTANTS, at 133-38 (1984).
17. See id. at 27-37.
18. The United Mine Workers of America estimates that a 10 million ton
S02 emission reduction, with 50% to 70% of reductions achieved through fuelswitching, could cause 40,000 to 60,000 coal mining job losses in high-sulfur
producing regions of northern Appalachia and the Midwest, with direct annual
income losses of $1.1 to $1.6 billion and total annual economic losses ranging
from $3 to $4.6 billion, including income multiplier effects. Id. at 198-99. The
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment has estimated these direct income losses at $600 to $800 million annually with total annual economic losses
of $1.6 to $2.3 billion, taking into account potential increases in mining employment associated with the construction of new power plants. Id.
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sumers while protecting the employment base of traditional coalproducing areas.
B.

Direct Cost-Sharing Through Electric Generation Fees

Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA) co-sponsored the introduction of the first national cost-sharing bill on June 23,
1983.19 House Bill 3400 required the fifty highest emitting power
plants to reduce S02 emissions by meeting an emission limitation
equivalent to EPA's 1979 Revised New Source Performance Standards for steam-electric fossil-fired sources, 20 and provided for an
Acid Deposition Control Fund to pay for ninety percent of the
capital costs of compliance. Funds would be collected from all
non-nuclear sources of electric utility generation at a rate of one
2
mill ($0.001) per kilowatt-hour. '
The co-sponsors of House Bill 3400 recognized that costsharing was necessary to mitigate the employment and economic
impacts of acid rain control legislation:
The Congress finds that . . . [t]he installation of additional control technology for a number of existing electric utility plants would provide an effective and
verifiable means to reduce emissions of sulfur dioxides;
and... [a] nationwide fee system is necessary to provide
funding for a portion of the capital cost of the required
technology so as to lessen utility rate increases and avoid
22
economic disruption or increased unemployment.
Despite support from the United Mine Workers of America
(UMWA), industry groups, and midwestern states in favor of the
regional cost-sharing concept advanced by House Bill 3400,23 the
bill was criticized on three grounds: (1) that the top fifty emitting
power plants included several plants whose design characteristics
or age made it technically impossible or uneconomic to retrofit
19. H.R. 3400, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter House Bill 3400].
20. The 1979 Revised New Source Performance Standards for Steam-Electric Power Plants require newly constructed units to meet a sliding-scale emission rate equivalent to 0.6 to 1.2 pounds of S02 per million BTU by the use of
continuous emission reduction technology achieving a percentage reduction of
emissions not less than 70%.
21. H.R. 3400, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).

22. H.R. 3400, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(l 1), (12) (1983).
23. See generally, Acid Rain Control. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and
the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce on H.R. 3400, 98th
Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess., pt. 1, at 3 (1983 and 1984); pt. 2, at 1 (1984).
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pollution control technology; 24 (2) that the electric generation fee
would impose undue costs on northeastern states with relatively
low S02 emission rates; 2 5 and (3) that an excess emissions
formula, with unacceptable impacts on states with relatively high
rates of emissions, would be used to make up an estimated three
million ton annual shortfall between the emission reductions
achieved at the fifty largest plants and a ten million ton annual
26
S02 reduction from 1980 emission levels.
In addition, environmental groups criticized House Bill 3400
on the grounds that an annual ten million ton S02 emission reduction was insufficient to meet environmental protection
needs. 2 7 Despite its technical deficiencies, however, by drawing
attention to the social welfare costs of proposed emission reduction legislation, and the need to minimize employment and community dislocation through direct or indirect forms of
interregional cost-sharing, House Bill 3400 played a pivotal role
in the acid rain debate.
C.

Freedom-of-Choice Measures

In late 1983, a new group of acid rain control proposals
called for two-phase emission reduction strategies to be achieved
through statewide average electric utility emission rates of 2.0
pounds of S02 per million BTU in the first phase and 1.2 pounds
of S02 per million BTU in the second phase. 2 8 Proponents of
these so-called "freedom-of-choice" or "least-cost" bills ignored
the proposals' potential adverse employment impacts and heralded the direct cost savings utilities could realize by avoiding
capital outlays for technological controls at existing power
29
plants.
24. Id. pt. 1, at 566-69 (testimony of Sy S. Ali, Public Service Company of
Indiana, Inc.); pt. 2, at 424-29 (testimony of A. Joseph Dowd, American Electric
Power Company, Inc.).
25. Id. pt. 1, at 31-35 (testimony of Mario M. Cuomo, Governor, State of
New York); pt. 1 at 42-46 (statement of United States Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, D-NY).

26. Id. pt. 2, at 758-66 (statement of Gerald Hawkins, International COMPAC Coordinator, Illinois, on behalf of the United Mine Workers of America).

27. Id. pt. 1, at 110-12 (testimony of Dr. Michael Oppenheimer, Environmental Defense Fund).
28. See, e.g., H.R. 4567, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1983).
29. See, e.g., Paul R. Portney, High-PriceCurefor Acid Rain, THE
August 12, 1983.

WASHINGTON

POST,

But while the two means of sulfur removal are expensive, they are
not equally so. If forced to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions by a fixed
amount, some power plants would voluntarily choose scrubbers. But
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
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Indeed, estimates of the direct utility compliance costs of
meeting statewide average emission rates were somewhat lower
than those associated with Senator Mitchell or Representative
Waxman's proposals of 1981-83.30 However, the impacts of
"freedom-of-choice" bills on coal production and job dislocation
were severe for the Midwest and for other high-emitting regions. 3 ' These socioeconomic costs were not included in estimates of the comparative utility costs of scrubbing and fuelswitching approaches to acid rain control.3 2 One study that evaluated both the direct utility costs and indirect socioeconomic
costs of technological and fuel-switching approaches to acid rain
control concluded:
The direct compliance costs to electric utilities would be
somewhat higher under technology based controls, but
these higher costs are likely to be more than offset by the
lower indirect costs associated with shifts in economic
activity. Technology based controls also are likely to
have less of an adverse effect on the mining industry, on
shifts in employment and population migration, on
worker productivity and training costs, and on public
and private community investment requirements ...
[T]he total present value of compliance costs would be
approximately $39 billion under technology based controls as compared with $44 billion under fuelthe overwhelming majority would find it more economical to shift to

lower-sulfur coal.
... Since each plant would choose the least expensive alternative,
the total costs of the sulfur reduction program would be minimized.
This "least-cost" approach would be good regulatory policy by either
Republican or Democratic lights.
Id. at A17.
30. See YANARELLA & IHARA, ACID RAIN DEBATE, supra note 11, at 188, Table
7.2 (estimating direct annual utility control costs of "least-cost" Udall-Cheney
Bill, H.R. 5370, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., at $3.26-$3.72 billion compared with
$4.22 billion for H.R. 3400).
31. See, e.g., U.S. CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CURBING
ACID RAIN: COST, BUDGET, AND COAL MARKET EFFECTS (June 1986) (estimated
17,000 coal mining job losses in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Pennsylvania by
1995 under statewide average emission rate of 1.2 pounds of S02 per million
BTU).

32. See id. The net present value utility costs of 10 million ton S02 reduction are estimated at $34.5 billion for "least-cost" polluter-pays program during
the period 1986-2015, compared with $35.5 billion for technology subsidy program with 90% of capital costs paid through electric generation fee of 0.5 mills
per kilowatt-hour. The 1995 coal mining job losses in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois

and Pennsylvania under these proposals were estimated at 21,900 jobs for
"least-cost" proposal and 12,600 jobs for technology subsidy approach.
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switching.3 3
D.

Targeted Emission Controls with Cost-Sharing

In 1985, EPA evaluated the engineering characteristics of
200 power plants, and ranked 120 plants based on the relative
ease of retrofitting scrubbers at each.3 4 This analysis led to comparative economic studies of "targeted" scrubber retrofit strate35
gies focusing on plants with the lowest costs of S02 removal.
These studies indicated that a targeted control strategy could reduce three to four million annual tons of S02 emissions by 1995
at costs comparable to freedom-of-choice proposals, but without
the large-scale job dislocations associated with fuel-switching.
Coupled with a form of direct cost-sharing, such as a modest fee
on national electric power generation, a targeted scrubber retrofit
strategy also would diminish the direct utility rate impacts of
36
compliance.
During the summer of 1988, I met with Senator George J.
Mitchell and negotiated the first compromise acid rain control
agreement incorporating targeted scrubbing and direct cost-sharing. My primary objective, which Senator Mitchell agreed to, was
that any agreement we reached must be coal-market neutral acid rain legislation should not cause regional coal production to
depart from expected future production in the absence of acid
rain control legislation. Senator Mitchell's primary objective,
with which I concurred, was that any compromise must achieve a
true ten million ton annual reduction of S02 emissions from
1980 levels.
We met our objectives. The Mitchell-UMWA compromise
reached on September 22, 1988, would have required thirty-two
listed power plants to retrofit S02 emission control technologies
by January 1, 1995. These plants were considered by EPA to be
the most likely to retrofit scrubbers to comply with any form of
acid rain control legislation due to their age, size, emissions and
site-specific characteristics. In the first phase of the compromise,
33. ARTHUR D. LrTLE, INC., REF. No. 50277, ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF ALTERNATIVE ACID RAIN CONTROL STRATEGIES, I-1 (1985).
34. ENERGY VENTURES ANALYSIS, INC., EVALUATION OF S02 EMISSIONS AND
FGD RETROFIT FEASIBILITY AT THE 200 Top EMITTING GENERATING STATIONS

(1985).
35. Memorandum from Ken Schweers, Bruce Braine & Judah Rose, ICF
Resources, Inc., to Rob Brenner &Jim Democker, EPA (Oct. 16, 1985) (on file
with author).

36. Id.
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capital cost payments of $200 per kilowatt of capacity would be

provided to the owners of the listed plants through a fee of one
mill ($0.001) per kilowatt-hour on the electric generation of
plants emitting at a rate in excess of 1.0 pound of S02 per million
BTU. This emission-based generation fee meant that very lowemitting plants, such as those in "clean" states of the West, would
not contribute to midwestern cleanup costs.
The second phase of the compromise required electric generating units larger than 100 megawatts to meet an emission rate
limit of 1.0 pound of S02 per million BTU by January 1, 2003.
These units would have discretion in the means selected for compliance, but would be entitled to capital cost subsidies if conventional or advanced clean coal technologies were employed.
EPA later confirmed that the Mitchell-UMWA compromise
would achieve a ten million ton annual reduction of S02 emissions from 1980 levels 3 7 with virtually no disruption of expected

future regional coal production or employment.3 8 Two weeks after Senator Mitchell and I reached agreement, The Washington Post
observed that we had constructed "a package that perfectly bal39
ances the concerns of special interests."
Unfortunately, not all of the "special interests" agreed.
Faced with opposition from industry and environmental groups,
Senator Mitchell withdrew our agreement along with other provisions of the Senate's clean air bill from floor consideration on October 4, 1988.40 In retrospect, this action was inevitable given the
37. Memorandum from Paul Schwengels, EPA, Air Economics Branch, to
Linda Fisher, Assistant Administrator for Policy, Planning and Evaluation, at 1
(Sept. 28, 1988) (on file with author).

38. ICF,

INC., ANALYSIS OF THE MITCHELL COMPROMISE ACID RAIN PROPO-

(Sept. 1988).
39. Michael Weisskopf, Can Clean Air Bill Break Free in Cloud of Clashing Interests?, THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 3, 1988, at A9.
SAL,

40. See 134 CONG. REC. S 14455-61 (1988) (remarks of Senator George J.
Mitchell):
A policy that imposes huge job losses in West Virginia or Ohio or Kentucky is no more acceptable than a policy that imposes heavy pollution
damage on Maine or Vermont or North Carolina.
.... The issue is no longer how each of us can best avoid our
share of these costs. The issue is how to fairly apportion those costs and
reduce that damage.
A few who say they support the Clean Air Act joined with the
many who oppose it. They remained rigid and unyielding, wholly unwilling to compromise, even when faced with the certainty that their
rigidity would result in no action this year. In reality, both want to postpone action to the future, when they hope circumstances will be more
favorable to their positions.
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lack of Senate consensus on other provisions of the proposed
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1988. Ultimately, other affected
industries and labor groups in the automotive, steel and chemical
sectors had not effectively reached out to support the MitchellUMWA compromise.
II.

DEFERRED COST-SHARING THROUGH MARKETABLE EMISSION
ALLOWANCES

The centerpiece of Title IV of the 1990 CAAA is a system of
transferrable emission allowances limiting total S02 emissions
from electric utility plants. 4 1 Each allowance represents a limited
right to emit one ton of S02 during a calendar year. 4 2 Allowances may be transferred among plants within a utility system,
banked for later use or sold. 4 3 The cost-sharing potential of the

emission allowance system depends on the development of a
workable market for allowances in which utilities with cost-effective emission control opportunities choose to over-control their
emissions and sell the resulting allowances to other utilities.
Title IV requires two phases of S02 emission reductions. By
January 1, 1995, 261 "affected units" at 111 listed power plants
must reduce emissions to the equivalent of 2.5 pounds of S02 per
million BTU based on their historic consumption of BTU during
the period 1985-87. 44 Each of these high-emitting affected units
is assigned a specific number of annual allowances during the
1995-99 Phase I period. 4 5 Because allowances are transferrable
within and among utility systems, individual unit emissions may
exceed the statutory assignment of allowances provided that the
unit owner holds allowances sufficient to cover the higher
46
emissions.
In Phase II, commencing January 1, 2000, all electric utility
units of seventy-five megawatts capacity or larger that emitted
S02 in 1985 at a rate in excess of 1.2 pounds of S02 per million
BTU will be limited to emission allowances equivalent to a 1.2
pound S02 emission rate based on their 1985-87 BTU consumption. 4 7 Similar constraints are imposed on smaller coal-fired and
Id. at S14455-57.
41. See 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 7651-7651o (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 42 U.S.C.S. § 7651c(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 42 U.S.C.S. § 7651d(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
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oil-fired units that emitted S02 at a rate in excess of 1.2 pounds

per million BTU in 1985.48
With limited exceptions, all new utility units commencing operation after enactment of the 1990 CAAA must obtain allowances for the SO2 emissions of these units from existing units
assigned allowances under Title IV.4 9 This new unit "cap" or
emission offset requirement was developed by EPA to prevent total S02 emissions from increasing following the Phase I and
Phase II reductions, and to ensure that an active market in emission allowances would develop. 50 Aggregate utility S02 emissions are capped at a level of 8.9 million tons per year
commencing January 1, 2000.51

A.

Evolution of the Byrd-Bond Amendment

Prior to the Bush Administration's June 1989 announcement
of its acid rain control proposal, analysts at EPA evaluated alternative approaches for achieving Phase I emission reductions: the
first required the twenty largest emitters of S02 to meet the
equivalent of an emission standard of 1.1 pounds per million
BTU; the second required a group of 107 plants to reduce emis52
sions to the equivalent of 2.5 pounds of S02 per million BTU.
In each case, marketable emission allowances would be assigned
to these plants, which could be sold or transferred among them53
selves or other substitute plants.
A draft Clean Air Act Options Paper circulated by EPA in
May 1989 gave the following assessment of the alternative Phase I
options :54
Option 1 (20 plants):
Pros:
Easy to implement (in first
phase), because the biggest
emitters are known.

Cons:
It seems unfair to subject some
plants to one standard, other
plants to another, less
stringent standard.

48. Id.

49. 42 U.S.C.S. § 7651b(e)

(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).

50. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power, supra note 6, at 1518 (testimony of William K. Reilly, Administrator, EPA).
51. 42 U.S.C.S. § 7651b(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
52. Memorandum from ICF Resources, Inc., to EPA (May 23, 1989) (on file
with author).
53. Id.
54. U.S. EPA, CLEAN AIR ACT OPTIONS PAPER: ACID RAIN, at 15-16 (draft,

May 3, 1989).
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Politically more palatable,
Could force greater use of
because this regime would only scrubbers because of narrow
affect twenty plants in nine
focus.
states - thus generating less

widespread opposition.
These plants tend to be in
regions whose electric rates are
somewhat lower than certain
other regions.

Concentrates cost effects on
narrow geographic sector,
increasing the political
pressure for subsidies.

Option 2 (107 plants):
Pros:

Cons:

Fairest of all the options requires all plants to meet the
same standard.

More difficult to implement,
since it requires regulation of
many more plants.

Does not force one region or
set of utility companies to meet
disproportionate share of
burden of reductions.

Will engender more
widespread political
opposition, since 107 plants in
eighteen states would be
affected.

Low cost, since it allows
individual plants to meet
requirements in any way they
choose.
EPA was aware that the twenty plant Phase I option meant
fewer job displacements than a large number of plants meeting a
weaker emission standard through fuel-switching. Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-WV), among other congressional leaders, also recognized that the twenty plant option would provide more
effective protection of coal mining jobs. Senator Byrd communicated his position on EPA's alternative options to President Bush
in a letter, which Senator GeorgeJ. Mitchell delivered to the President at a meeting of congressional leaders, shortly before the
President announced his acid rain plan:
I strongly support the position taken by both EPA
Administrator William Reilly and Secretary of State Jim
Baker regarding the need to target the twenty top sulfur
dioxide emitting plants and requiring these plants to
meet a 1.1 pound per million BTU standard by the end
of 1995 ....
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
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Most importantly, however, this option which would
target the twenty top emitting plants would encourage,
but not mandate, the use of technology as a compliance
strategy. As Administrator Reilly has pointed out, this
has the important advantage of avoiding unnecessary
disruptions of existing coal markets, which would have a
devastating effect on local and regional economies.
The other option before you, which would require
all generating units of 100 megawatts capacity or greater
to meet a 2.5 pounds per million BTU standard by 1995,
would literally wipe out the high sulfur coal industry....
EPA estimates that this would cause fifty-four existing
coal contracts to be broken between now and 1995, engendering the loss, according to EPA, of 8,000 jobs
throughout West Virginia, Kentucky, Illinois, Indiana,
55
Ohio and Pennsylvania.
Despite such warnings, the President announced his selection
of EPA's 107 plant Phase I acid rain plan on June 12, 1989.56 In
doing so, the President set the stage for a year of political maneuvering to soften the impact of the 107 plant option on coal industry employment, coal-dependent communities and midwestern
industrial states heavily impacted by the plan.
B.

Senate and House Cost-Sharing Initiatives

Soon after President Bush's announcement, members of the
United States Senate and House of Representatives initiated efforts to incorporate cost-sharing within the Administration's acid
rain proposal. Senator Byrd, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and Representative Philip R. Sharp (D-IN),
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Energy and Power, led
the fight to improve the regional equity of the Administration's
107 plant plan. Representative Sharp highlighted the key issues:
One gross inequity stands out in the [P]resident's
proposal. Several midwestern and southeastern states
are being asked to make emission reductions above and
beyond their proportional contribution to the problem 55. Letter from United States Senator Robert C. Byrd to President George
H. W. Bush (June 6, 1989) (on file with author).

56. White House Fact Sheet on the President's Clean Air Plan, 25 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 882 (June 12, 1989). The initial group of 107 plants targeted
for Phase I controls was expanded subsequently to 111 plants after additional
plant emission data became available.
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being asked, in effect, to make reductions for both themselves and others.
The [P]resident would require nine states, which
contribute only fifty-one percent of the nation's sulfur
dioxide (S02) emissions, to achieve and pay for sixtyseven percent of the S02 reductions.
Even this vast discrepancy understates the unfairness, because states that are among the highest overall
emitters of S02 and NOx escape cleanup responsibility
entirely in proposals that focus for cost-effectiveness reasons on emissions from utilities, which tend to be large
single sources of these pollutants.
A pound of S02 or NOx removed from the air is
of equal benefit to the environment whether it is removed from a small industrial facility in Texas or a large
power plant in the [M]idwest.
There is a way to reconcile the conflict between
cost-effectiveness and fairness: cost-sharing. The argument is emphatically not that all of America's citizens
should pitch in to clean up a few states' emissions; it is
almost the reverse: that a few states should not be cleaning up both their own and somebody else's portion.
Through cost-sharing, Texas can "pay" the targeted
states to clean up its fair share of emissions, but at a
lower cost than if it actually had to clean up the emis57
sions in Texas.
The Senate and House of Representatives pursued different
paths in their efforts to modify the Administration's Phase I plan.
In the Senate, a bi-partisan group of fourteen midwestern members, led by Senator Byrd, proposed to reduce the number of
plants included in Phase I, and to provide a direct capital cost
subsidy for the use of emission control technologies at Phase I
plants through a nationwide fee on fossil-fired electric power
generation. 58
57. United States Representative Philip R. Sharp, Acid Rain: Making A Few
States Pay, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 22, 1989, at A26.

58. The 20-plant proposal favored by Senator Byrd's group would have
provided a 90% capital cost subsidy for plants electing to retrofit scrubbers to
meet an emission limit of 1.1 pounds of S02 per million BTU. The capital cost
subsidy would have been paid through the proceeds of a nationwide fee of one-
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Responding to Senator Byrd's initiatives, Senate Majority
Leader Mitchell and Senator Max Baucus (D-MT), Chairman of
the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, agreed
to revise the Administration's acid rain proposal. The MitchellBaucus compromise would have required the twenty largest emitters of S02 to reduce emissions to 1.1 pounds of S02 per million
BTU by 1995. 59 If this approach had been adopted by the Senate,
momentum could have developed for a nationwide fee on electric
generation in order to defray the costs of controls at these specific
plants. However, in its consideration of the Mitchell-Baucus compromise, the Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works chose to retain the Administration's 107 plant Phase I option in Title IV of Senate Bill 1630.60
In the House, Representative Sharp and Representative John
Dingell (D-MI), Chairman of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, developed a cost-sharing mechanism based on a user fee
of fifty-five dollars per ton of S02 emitted by industrial sources,
with the proceeds earmarked for the 107 plants included in Phase
1.61 The White House, concerned that such a "user fee" would
constitute a new federal tax, strenuously opposed the plan. 6 2 As a
result, insufficient votes were committed to the plan, and it never
reached the floor for consideration by the full House of
Representatives.
C.

Senate-Administration Negotiations

Final Senate agreement on the 1990 CAAA was preceded by
a series of closed-door negotiations between representatives of
the Executive Branch, and Democratic and Republican members
of the Senate. In these negotiations, each of the major titles of
Senate Bill 1630 as reported by the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works was modified to conform to the Administration's reported clean air "budget" or the overall
macroeconomic impact of clean air reforms that the Administra63
tion was prepared to support.
halfa mill ($0.005) per kilowatt-hour on all U.S. fossil-fired generation. See Nov.
30, 1989 Memorandum, supra note 4, at 3.
59. Statement of Senate Majority Leader GeorgeJ. Mitchell (D-ME) (Sept.

22, 1989) (on file with author).
60. S. 1630, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990).
61. See Michael Weisskopf, Dingell Acid Rain Plan Spreads Cleanup Costs, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 3, 1989, at A6.

62. Id.
63. See Quilt of Compromise Stitched on Clean Air, THE WASHINGTON POST, Mar.

5, 1990, at A7.
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As closed-door negotiations proceeded, Senator Byrd's
group of midwestern senators agreed to a compromise proposal
for enhancing the incentives for technological emission controls
in the acid rain control provisions of Senate Bill 1630. The ByrdBond Amendment, co-sponsored by Senators Byrd and Christopher S. Bond (R-MO), modified Senate Bill 1630 by permitting a
two-year time extension under Phase I for utilities that choose to
use "qualifying technologies" 6 4 to reduce emissions, and by creating a system of two-to-one bonus emission allowances for emission reductions achieved during 1997-99 through qualifying
technologies .65
As a condition for accepting the Byrd-Bond Amendment, the
Senate and Executive Branch negotiators imposed a limit of 3.5
million tons on the total number of S02 allowances that would be
made available under the two-year extension and two-to-one bonus provisions of modified Senate Bill 1630. This ceiling translated to ten to fifteen gigawatts of retrofit scrubber capacity, or
ten to fifteen large 1,000 megawatt plants that could take advantage of the two-year delay and bonus emission allowance program. 6 6 The 3.5 million ton pool of Phase I allowances was
created, in effect, by advancing the Phase I deadline of the Administration's initial acid rain proposal by one year, from December 31, 1995, to January 1, 1995, with the resulting additional
S02 reductions assigned to the pool.
The two-year extension and two-to-one bonus allowance provisions encourage technological emission reductions during
Phase I by offering utilities an opportunity to earn substantial
numbers of allowances that can either be used to delay compliance, or sold to defray the capital and operating costs of emission
controls. If delayed compliance is chosen, generating units qualifying for a two-year time extension will receive sufficient allowances to cover each unit's emissions during 1995-96. If a unit
achieves compliance with Phase I byJanuary 1, 1995, the two-year
extension allowances may be banked for later use or sold to other
64. "Qualifying Phase I technology" is defined as a technological system of
continuous emission reduction which achieves a 90% reduction in sulfur dioxide
emissions from the emissions which would have resulted from the use of fuels
which were not subject to treatment prior to combustion. 42 U.S.C.S.
§ 7615(a)(19) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
65. 42 U.S.C.S. § 7651c(d)(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991). These two-to-one
bonus allowances are to be awarded by EPA on the difference between a unit's
controlled emissions and its tonnage emissions at a rate of 1.2 pounds of S02
per million BTU.
66. See Nov. 30, 1989 Memorandum, supra note 8, at Table 2.
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utilities. The two-to-one bonus allowances applicable during the
period 1997-99 also may be banked or sold.
D.

Conference Agreement

The acid rain title of Senate Bill 1630 formed the basis for
the conference agreement creating Title IV. During the HouseSenate conference, additional allocation provisions were agreed
to for "clean" and "growth" states seeking allowances to ensure a
margin for growth during Phase II, when the nationwide emissions cap of 8.9 million tons of S02 becomes effective. 6 7
Both the House and Senate committees contended with pressures from diverse interests seeking allowances for future emissions growth. In creating various allowance entitlements for
"clean" and "growth" states, Congress may have diluted the
value of the Phase I extension and bonus allowance pool by reducing the potential demand for the resale of these allowances to
68
utilities in other states.
Concerns about utility "hoarding" of allowances led the
67. Section 405(a)(2) of the CAAA creates a Phase II reserve of 5.3 million
tons of allowances that are to be assigned at a rate of 530,000 tons per year
during the period 2000-2009 to various categories of low-emitting plants. 42
U.S.C.S. § 7651d(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
68. In the original Administration proposal, units emitting at a rate below
1.2 pounds of S02 per million BTU in 1985 were exempted from the emission
allowance program provided their emissions remained below this rate. Western
and other low-emitting states recognized that as these clean units were retired,
they would need to purchase emission allowances from the Midwest to cover
emissions from new generating units. Concerns about the lack of emission allowances granted to clean states led these states to seek inclusion in the allowance program. See, e.g., HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Energy and Power, supra note
6, pt. 1, at 115-16:
Mr. Tauzin: So, in essence, after paying for 50% of the cleanup, and
earning 50% of the credits, these utility plants in these nine States will
have what we Cajuns call a lagniappe, for having paid their fair share of
the cleanup.
Lagniappe may not be a term that you are familiar with, Mr. Reilly, but
I know that Mr. Moore understands lagniappe. These States now have
lagniappe that they can sell and make money from, or they can use to
grow. Now, the States on the other hand, like mine, where many of our
utilities . . . are now emitting at much lower rates.
For our States to grow, we can increase our production, and I understand that, because we are below 1.2, and we can increase the production of that plant, as long as our rates stay the same.
But if we want to grow, and we are interested in growing in Louisiana
...
then we have to go pay somebody off to grow. Is that right?
Mr. Reilly: That's right. If you are talking about constructing new
plants, yes, that is correct.
Id. (colloquy between Representative Billy Tauzin (D-LA) and William K. Reilly,
Administrator, EPA).
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House and Senate to provide for public auctions of allowances by
EPA, with 2.8 percent of all regular allowances reserved by EPA
for auction purposes. 69 The conference committee blended the
auction provisions of the House and Senate bills. 70 The committee also adopted provisions from the House bill awarding up to
300,000 bonus emission allowances to utilities that reduce emissions through energy conservation.
The final language of the Byrd-Bond Amendment established an "order of receipt" priority for awarding the two-year
extension allowances to units employing qualifying Phase I technology. 7 1 Section 404(d)(3) of the CAAA states in part: "The
Administrator shall review and take final action on each extension
proposal in order of receipt, consistent with section 408 .. .and

for an approved proposal shall designate the unit or units as an
72
eligible [P]hase I extension unit."
The "order of receipt" language in section 404 was added in
contemplation of possible over-subscription of the 3.5 million ton
Phase I extension and bonus allowance pool. The conference bill
provided that EPA should award all of the two-year extension allowances to qualifying units before awarding any two-to-one bonus allowances. These limits were imposed because Congress
recognized that there could be far more demand for Phase I extension and bonus allowances than the maximum supply fixed by
the 3.5 million ton allowance pool.
III.

EPA

IMPLEMENTATION

OF THE BYRD-BOND AMENDMENT

Implementation of the Phase I extension and bonus allowance program created by the Byrd-Bond Amendment has proven
more controversial than its sponsors may have envisioned.
To
assist in the development of regulations implementing Title IV,
EPA established an Acid Rain Advisory Committee (ARAC) consisting of representatives of industry, labor, environmental and
academic organizations. ARAC has conducted six public meetings to provide technical and policy input to EPA's proposed
69. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power, supra note 6, pt.
3, at 37-38 (statement ofJo Campbell, Commissioner, Public Utility Commission

of Texas).
70. Joint Staff Recommendation on Acid Rain, House-Senate Conference on Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990, Oct. 22, 1990.

71. 42 U.S.C.S. § 7651c(d)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
72. Id.
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73
emission allowance trading regulations.
In ARAC's deliberations, some industry interests argued for
a strict "first-come, first-served" interpretation of the "order of
receipt" language of section 404(d)(3) of CAAA. This meant that
utility applications for extension and bonus allowances would be
processed by EPA based literally on the time of their receipt, as
determined by a date and time stamp or similar procedure. In the
event of a tie, or an over-subscription of the 3.5 million ton allowance pool, a lottery was proposed as a means for distributing
allowances .7
Recognizing that the Byrd-Bond extension and bonus allowance program was intended to encourage the use of control technologies for meeting Phase I requirements, 7 5 utility and labor
groups on ARAC endorsed an alternative pro rata method for distributing these allowances. 76 EPA would accept all applications
for extension and bonus allowances on a date certain and, in the
event that total requested allowance awards exceeded the statutory 3.5 million ton pool, would issue each qualifying unit a percentage of its requested allowances.
In its proposed emission allowance regulations, EPA rejected
a pro rata distribution and sought comment on an alternative
method for awarding Phase I extension and bonus allowances employing a telephone-based queuing procedure. 7 7 Under this approach, designated representatives of each utility unit seeking an
award would dial an 800 telephone number at a specified time.
73. 56 Fed. Reg. 63005 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 72, 73,75 &

77).
74. See Memorandum from Rachel Hopp, Chief, EPA Permits and Technologies Section, EPA, to Permits and Technology Subcommittee (Jan. 24, 1991)

(on file with author).
75. See U.S. Senator Robert C. Byrd, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
supra note 4, at 482:
All of the provisions regarding eligible Phase I extension units are intended to encourage utilities with affected Phase I units to incorporate
the use of scrubbers in their overall compliance strategies, and thus
help reduce, at least during Phase I, the potentially disruptive impact of

the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 on existing coal markets. ...
While it is not yet possible to know precisely what impact the 1990
Amendments will have on the coal industry, it is my belief that the
scrubber incentives incorporated into the law will have a significant
positive effect in terms of minimizing the adverse impact of the Phase I
emission reduction requirements on high-sulfur coal.
76. Memorandum from Henry V. Nickle, Norman W. Ficthorn & Lynne L.
Johnson, to All Participants in UARG Meeting on Phase I Extension Issues, at 2
(Feb. 12, 1991) (on file with author).

77. 56 Fed. Reg. 63040-63041 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 72, 73,
75, 77).
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Electronic voice-mail measuring devices would determine the order of receipt of each incoming call:
Subpart L would provide the procedures for early
ranking of Phase I Extension plans submitted under Section 72.42 of today's proposal. Subpart L addresses two
concerns: (1) the statutory mandate in Section 404 (d)(3)
of the Act that submissions for Phase I extensions be
considered by the Administrator "in order of receipt",
and (2) the need of the regulated community to know as
early as possible whether they will be eligible for Phase I
Extension allowances. Because of the economic benefits
a source would derive from a Phase I Extension, some
estimates indicate that the Phase I Extension reserve of
up to 3.5 million tons .. . may be oversubscribed....
The Agency is, thus, proposing an Early Ranking
procedure for determining the order in which to act on
Phase I Extension applications. The [A]gency proposes
to use a voice-mail telephone queuing procedure followed by a written Phase I Extension Early Ranking application submission mailed not later than midnight of
78
the same business day of the phone queue.
In rejecting the proposed pro rata approach for distributing
extension allowances, EPA acknowledged that such an approach
"might potentially encourage the installation of more control
technology." 79 However, EPA indicated that the "order of receipt" language controlled its interpretation of Section 404(d) of
CAAA, requiring a sequential distribution of allowances to applicants rather than a share of allowances to all applicants.8 0 EPA
also left open the possibility of a private allowance pool among
applicants: "Nor would today's proposal preclude side-bar pro
rata agreements between applicants, should utilities wish to pursue such arrangements. EPA would have no involvement, however, with such agreements." 8'
Faced with this invitation, utilities are making arrangements
among themselves to reallocate the 3.5 million ton pool of Phase
I extension and bonus allowances, irrespective of the specific
method chosen by EPA to determine the "order of receipt" of
78. Id. at 63039-40.
79. Id. at 63041.
80. Id.

81. Id.
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applications or EPA's actual award of extension allowances. 8 2 A
private reallocation of this type already has been endorsed by the
3
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners.8
Thus, the congressional intent underlying Section 404(d) of
CAAA may be effected by private contractual agreements among
utilities notwithstanding the "order of receipt" language imposed
on EPA by the statute itself. This should expand the number of
utilities able to participate in the Phase I bonus allowance program, increase the number of Phase I units employing emission
control technologies instead of fuel-switching, and reduce the
number of coal mining jobs lost due to Phase I compliance. A
private reallocation of these bonus allowances also would guard
against the possibility that the entire 3.5 million ton pool could be
84
awarded to a handful of very large, high-emitting units.
IV.

EMISSION ALLOWANCE TRADING OUTLOOK

It is premature to speculate on the extent of the market for
emission allowances that may develop under Title IV. If the emission allowance market functions efficiently, it should yield high
degrees of emission reduction at many of the large baseload
power plants that had been targeted for initial controls by the
1988 Mitchell-UMWA compromise.8 5 In the absence of any allowance trading, all 111 power plants affected during Phase I
would be required to reduce emissions to the equivalent of 2.5
pounds of S02 per million BTU, inducing a massive disruption of
national coal markets.
The 1991 proposal by the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT)
to establish allowance cash and futures markets is an encouraging
sign that market mechanisms will be in place to facilitate allowance trading.8 6 CBOT's application to the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission contemplates that firms reducing more pollution than their minimum statutory requirements will be reimbursed for doing so through the sale of excess allowances:
82. Bonus Pool Moves to Develop Contracts, 2 COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES REVIEW
5 (Nov. 25, 1991).
83. See Proceedingsof the 1991 Annual Meeting of the NationalAssociation of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, CONVENTION FLOOR RES. 3 (Dec. 17, 1991).
84. For American Electric Power Company's estimate regarding one large
unit, see infra note 95 and accompanying text.
85. For a discussion of the 1988 Mitchell-UMWA compromise, see supra
Section I, part D.
86. BOARD OF TRADE OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, APPLICATION FOR DESIGNATION AS A CONTRACT MARKET: CLEAN AIR FUTURES (1991).
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It is widely agreed that a market approach to reducing
pollution will help assure the total cost of the program,
and the overall effect on electricity rates, is
minimized....
Firms that can cut pollution at low cost are encouraged
to provide relatively large amounts of the pollution reduction, and are compensated according to the amount
of "clean air" they produce. Firms for which pollution
reductions are more costly can choose not to cut pollution, but would have to compensate the plants that make
disproportionately large cuts in pollution. By encouraging pollution reduction to come from those most efficient at doing so, a market approach leads to the use of
lowest cost pollution control equipment first. The market approach uses the lowest possible amount of society's resources to achieve mandated pollution
reductions, and thus leads to the smallest possible in87
crease in product costs.

The economic value of the 3.5 million ton Phase I extension
and bonus allowance pool, and the deferred cost-sharing potential it represents, will be determined by the market prices these
allowances command. Conventional economic theory suggests
that allowance prices will reflect the marginal costs of emission
reductions. 8 8 The marginal costs of control should increase during the early stages of Phase II, when virtually all coal-fired and
oil-fired electric utility units must hold S02 allowances equivalent
to a 1.2 pound per million BTU emission limit at their 1985-87
historic level of BTU consumption, and when the nationwide S02
emissions cap of 8.9 million tons becomes effective. Later in
Phase II, allowance prices may decline as existing generating
units are retired and their allowances become available to lower89
emitting new units.
Subsequent to enactment of the allowance program in November 1990, estimates of the market value of allowances have
declined from EPA's initial estimates. Values as great as $700 per
87. Id. at 1-2.
88. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power, supra note 6, at 227

(comments of Council on Economic Advisors, projecting marginal control costs
ranging from $100 to $400 per ton in Phase I and approximately $700 per ton at
beginning of Phase II).

89. B. Elman, B. Braine & R. Stuebi, Acid Rain Emission Allowances and Future

Capacity Growth in the Electric Utility Industry, 40J.

AIR

& WASTE MGMT. ASS'N 979,

980-81 (1990).
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ton by Phase II were cited by EPA when the Administration first
proposed the allowance trading program.9 0 Surveys of potential
allowance buyers and sellers conducted in 1991 by the Fieldston
Company indicated the following estimates of allowance prices: 9'
Survey Date
Phase I (1995)
Best Estimate
High

June/July 1991
$450
$725

October/November 1991
$320
$550

Low

$300

$200

Phase 11 (2000)
Best Estimate
High

$700
$1,000

$400
$700

Low

$500

$300

The October/November 1991 survey's "best estimates" suggest an overall value for the 3.5 million ton Phase I extension and
bonus allowance pool of $1.1 billion in 1995 and $1.4 billion in
2000, with a "high" estimated value as great as $2.45 billion by
2000.92 If this pool were allocated among twenty power plants
with an average capacity of 1,000 megawatts, and the allowances
were sold at the best estimate prices, the potential benefits would
be worth some $55 million per plant in 1995, or $70 million per
plant in 2000. These benefits in turn could be passed through to
utility ratepayers to defray the capital costs of emission control
technologies. As discussed below, state public utility regulatory
commissions already are moving in this direction.
V.

RECENT STATE REGULATORY EXPERIENCE

The potential value of extension and bonus emission allowances has played an influential role in recent state regulatory
proceedings concerning utility compliance with Phase I of the
1990 CAAA. Cases in Ohio, Pennsylvania and West Virginia illustrate the important financial advantages of the deferred costsharing that can result through the sale of extension and bonus
allowances.
90. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power, supra note 6, at 255.
91. CSR Emissions Allowance Trading Index, 2 COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES REVIEW

3 (Nov. 25, 1991).
92. Id.
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American Electric Power Company, Inc.

Electric utilities operating in the state of Ohio are periodically required to submit long-term forecast reports to the Ohio
Public Utilities Commission (PUC). 9 3

As part of its regular re-

view of the long-term forecast reports of Ohio Power Company
and Columbus Southern Power Company, two subsidiaries of
American Electric Power Company (AEP), the Ohio PUC initiated
a proceeding in 1991 concerning AEP's proposals for compliance
94
with Phase I of the 1990 CAAA.
The issues in this proceeding were joined by an initial AEP
study of the costs of scrubbing and fuel-switching at Ohio Power's
2,600-megawatt Gavin plant in Gallia County, Ohio. The Gavin
plant is the largest single source of S02 emissions in the United
States, and receives most of its coal from a nearby mine owned
and operated by an AEP mining subsidiary. Based on preliminary
estimates of the costs of scrubbing and fuel-switching at the Gavin
plant, AEP proposed to close its captive mine and to purchase
95
lower-sulfur coals from the West or from central Appalachia.
On May 14, 1991, the staff of the Ohio PUC issued a report
critical of AEP's proposed compliance plan. 96

The staff con-

cluded "that the methodology employed by AEP to conduct its
[p]reliminary [s]tudy was inappropriate and unreasonable, and
' '9 7
that the results of its [p]reliminary [s]tudy are unfounded.
The Ohio PUC entered an order the same day directing AEP to
submit a complete system-wide CAAA compliance plan taking
into consideration, inter alia, "the value of emission allowances
produced by over-complying at Gavin, which may be used elsewhere in the AEP system to avoid compliance expenditures otherwise required by the Clean Air Act [A]mendments." 98 AEP
complied with PUC's order and filed a preliminary system-wide
93. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4935.04 (Anderson 1991).
94. In the Matter of the Long-Term Forecast Reports of Ohio Power Company; In the
Matter of the 1990 Long-Term ForecastReport of The Columbus Southern Power Company,
Opinion and Order of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio at 2-3 (No. 90660-EL-FOR (Phase II)) (1991) [hereinafter Opinion and Order].
95. Press release issued by American Electric Power Company, Inc. (Jan.
28, 1991) (on file with author).
96. PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF OHIO, STAFF REPORT ON AEP's PRELIMINARY STUDY OF COMPLIANCE OPTIONS FOR THE GENERAL JAMES M. GAVIN PLANT
UNDER THE FEDERAL CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990 (1990).

97. Id. at v.
98. Opinion and Order, supra note 94, at 3.
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compliance report on May 31, 1991.99
Following local public hearings and an adjudicatory hearing
to review the reasonableness and adequacy of AEP's preliminary
system-wide plan, the Ohio PUC issued an opinion and order on
September 24, 1991. The commission concluded that:
The three most critical issues which have the greatest impact on a determination of least cost compliance at
Gavin are the projected prices and supply reliability of
low-sulfur coal, whether AEP will receive reserve allowances if it installs scrubbers at Gavin, and the market
value of allowances to be earned. .

.

. AEP's lack of a

detailed fuel cost sensitivity analyses make[s] the fuel
switch option at Gavin very risky. On the other hand,
most parties agree that installing a scrubber at Gavin
would not be cost effective unless AEP received its share
of reserve allowances, which will not be known until
March of 1992 or possibly later.10 0
The Ohio PUC's analysis indicated that emission allowance
values in 1995 could range from a low of $429 per ton to a high of
$989 per ton.' 0 ' AEP estimated that the Gavin plant alone could
receive some 790,000 extension and bonus allowances, or nearly
one-fourth of the total 3.5 million ton reserve pool.' 0 2 Using a
value of $400 per ton, AEP determined that these allowances
would be worth in excess of $300 million. 10 3 Taking this into
account, the Ohio PUC found that:
AEP should consider more seriously over-compliance in
Phase I and the trading and banking of excess allowances
as a compliance option. This could provide AEP with
additional cost savings not only in Phase I but in Phase II
as well ....

We would also encourage AEP to explore an

overall allowance trading strategy and the possibility of
allowance pooling arrangements apart from its power
pooling agreement, possibly including plants in other
systems. 104
99.

AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY,

AEP

SYSTEM PRELIMINARY ACID

(May 31, 1991).
Opinion and Order, supra note 94, at 31.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Opinion and Order, supra note 94, at 18.

RAIN COMPLIANCE REPORT

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
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In addition, the commission encouraged AEP "to explore
collaborating with other prospective bidders for reserve allowances and to determine the feasibility of a post-queue, prorata allocation of scrubber reserve allowances."1 0 5 By participating in such an after-the-fact reallocation of the extension and twoto-one bonus allowance pool, regardless of the outcome of EPA's
telephone queue or other distribution method, AEP could assure
itself of a substantial share of its estimated 790,000 ton
entitlement.
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the commission
determined that AEP "should keep both its fuel switching and
scrubbing options open at Gavin until it can be determined
whether AEP will receive reserve allowances."' 0 6 Specifically, the
Ohio PUC recognized that the potential value of the extension
and bonus allowances AEP could receive from EPA could tip the
economic balance in favor of scrubbing: "The installation of
scrubbers at Gavin can provide the lowest cost option consistent
with the provision of adequate and reliable service, provided AEP
10 7
receives its share of reserve allowances from EPA."'
Subsequent to the Ohio commission's order, AEP has undertaken preliminary site construction at the Gavin plant to provide
for the installation of scrubbers; has applied for permits to construct barge unloading facilities for the transportation of lime
used in the scrubbing process; and has sought authorization to
issue partially tax-exempt bonds to finance the capital costs of retrofitting Gavin with scrubbers. 10 8
B.

Allegheny Power System, Inc.

Allegheny Power System (APS) is a utility holding company
serving customers in portions of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Virginia and West Virginia. In 1990, APS initiated a comprehensive system-wide compliance plan covering all plants in its system
for both Phase I and Phase II of Title IV. 10 9 Its analysis, in the
form of a five-volume study, was distributed early in 1991 to the
105. Id.at 28.
106. Id. at 38.
107. Id. at 38.
108. Press release issued by American Electric Power Company (Nov. 26,
1991).
109. 1 ALLEGHENY POWER SYSTEM, INC., STRATEGY TO COMPLY WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990, Overview Report of A
Multilevel Screening Analysis Prepared by Allegheny Power Service Coporation (1991)

[hereinafter

ALLEGHENY POWER SYSTEM STRATEGY].
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0
five state regulatory commissions in its service territory.1
The APS analysis evaluated 31.8 million combinations of
scrubbing, fuel-switching, early retirement and other control options at its system plants.' ' ' After an initial screening analysis for
cost-effectiveness, ten scrubbing and fuel-switching options were
selected for more detailed computer modeling. 12 The APS study
also evaluated, but did not explicitly take into account in its recommended compliance strategy, the values of the extension and
bonus allowances it could receive through scrubbing and the socioeconomic impacts of fuel-switching in its service territory.
Most of the coal currently consumed by APS is produced by
mines located within its service territory.
The APS compliance study indicated that scrubbing the three
units of the 1,920-megawatt Harrison Station located in Harrison
County, West Virginia, was the most reasonable and cost-effective
Phase I compliance option." 3 Scrubbing this plant would generate sufficient emission reductions to cover APS's entire Phase I
tonnage reduction requirement, leaving aside the potential extension and bonus allowances APS might receive from EPA.
In early 199 1, APS executed contracts for the construction of
scrubbers at Harrison and initiated regulatory proceedings seeking pre-construction approval of the prudence of its compliance
strategy, and adjustments to its electric rates to provide current
recovery of a portion of its CAAA compliance costs during construction. APS estimated its overall Phase I CAAA compliance
14
capital costs at $806 million.'
Extensive public records were developed in the course of
APS's compliance plan reviews in Pennsylvania and West Virginia, the states containing most of APS's service territory. APS's
plan initially was attacked by natural gas industry intervenors on
the grounds that co-firing natural gas at Harrison Station would
be more cost-effective than scrubbing. The natural gas intervenors subsequently withdrew from these cases following a negotiated settlement with APS providing for modest additional gas use
at some of APS's other plants." 5

110. Id.
I 11. 2 ALLEGHENY POWER SYSTEM STRATEGY, Decision Model Analysis of Compliance Strategies Preparedby Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (1991).
112. 5 ALLEGHENY POWER SYSTEM STRATEGY, Analysis and Review of Scrubbing
vs. Low Sulfur Coal Options Prepared by Allegheny Power Service Corporation (1991).

113. Id. at 11-1.
114. See ALLEGHENY POWER SYSTEM STRATEGY, supra note 109.

115. Memorandum of Agreement on Behalf of the Public Service Commis-
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Another objection to APS's plan arose through challenges by
consumer advocates to the three-unit scrubbing strategy. The
consumer advocates in Pennsylvania" 6 and West Virginia" I7 argued that APS should scrub only two of the units at Harrison Station in Phase I, relying on additional energy conservation and
other measures to ensure compliance with Phase I. An additional
issue in both states concerned the proposed form of financial recovery of project costs.
Although APS had not relied on the availability of extension
or bonus allowances in its economic evaluation of the costs of
scrubbing and fuel-switching, the potential benefit of these allowances became a major issue in each of the state proceedings.
In an order dated December 12, 1991, the Public Service
Commission of West Virginia determined that:
[T]he three scrubber option is the most cost-effective alternative given the uncertainty of the Companies' ability
to economically cover any future excess emissions that
would result from the [Consumer Advocate Division's]
proposed two scrubber option. This finding is further
supported by the potential for excess allowances attached to the three scrubber option and the economic
benefits that such excess allowances can produce for the
Companies' customers to offset the compliance costs
paid by these customers."l 8
The West Virginia Public Service Commission's (PSC) decision incorporated a stipulated settlement agreement of the major
issues in the case reached among the Consumer Advocate Division, the PSC staff, and a group of industrial intervenors.' 1 9 The
PSC was presented with an issue of first impression in the determination of the appropriate treatment of allowance sales revenues, which the company argued should be deferred for later
sion or West Virginia Staff, Allegheny Power System, Inc., and Hope Gas, Inc.
(Sept. 26, 1991) (on file with author). See also, Press release issued by Office of the
Governor of West Virginia, Gas, Coal, and Power Company Officials Reach Agreement in
'Scrubber' Dispute, Governor Helps to Mediate (Sept. 27, 1991).
116. Brief of the Office of Consumer Advocate Before the Pennsylvania
Public Utilities Commission, Petitions of West Penn Power Co. (1991) (Nos. P910511 & P-910512).
117. Brief of the Consumer Advocate Division of the Public Service Commission of West Virginia (1991) (No. 91-231-E-CN).
118. Commission Order, Public Service Commission of West Virginia at
12-13 (1991) (No. 91-231-E-CN) [hereinafter Commission Order].
119. Id. at Exhibit A.
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consideration when the number of allowances that might be available were known with certainty. The stipulated settlement indicated that any such revenues should be passed back to ratepayers:
The analysis presented in this case by APS indicates that
it is likely that installing scrubbers on all three units at
Harrison power station will result in APS generating
more sulfur dioxide reductions than required for APS total system during Phase I under the CAAA. Under the
provisions of the CAAA these excess allowances may be
bought and sold. As an integral part of the agreement to
waive all objections to the project and to the agreement
to pay for a portion of the project during construction,
the parties agree that [Monongahela Power Company
and Potomac Edison's] share of revenues produced by
the sale of excess sulfur dioxide allowances should be
20
passed back to ratepayers.
The West Virginia PSC found that the stipulated agreement
on allowance sales proceeds was reasonable, and directed that the
companies "should be required to defer revenues from allowance
sales so that any such revenues will be available for disposition as
directed by the Commission."' 12 1 The commission also concluded
that the construction of scrubbers at the three units was reasonable, and that the applicants should receive a certificate of public
convenience and necessity for the proposed construction. 2 2 The
commission further approved a form of cost recovery as proposed

12
by the stipulated agreement. 3
APS's proceeding in Pennsylvania was initiated by West Penn
Power Company on April 3, 1991, and the case was heard before
an administrative law judge in October 1991. The recommended
decision of the administrative law judge was handed down on December 6, 1991.124 In its filings, West Penn Power, a part-owner
of the Harrison Station power plant, had sought a declaratory order from the commission that its plan to scrub three units at Har-

rison

Station was

reasonable,

prudent,

and

in the public

120. Id. at 3.
121. Commission Order, supra note 118, at 15.
122. Id. at 19-20.
123. Id. at 20.
124. Recommended Decision Before the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission (1991) (Nos. P-910511, P-910512 & P-910512C001) [hereinafter Recommended Decision].
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interest.' 2 5 West Penn Power also sought approval of a rate
surcharge for current recovery of a portion of its CAAA compliance costs.'

2 6

The Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate, the Office of
Trial Staff, and industrial intervenors mounted a variety of legal
and technical arguments against West Penn Power's petitions. It
was asserted that the commission lacked the authority to issue a
declaratory order on the prudence of West Penn's compliance
plan;' 27 that rate relief was not permissible because the installation of scrubbers would generate revenues through the sale of
emission allowances, contravening a Pennsylvania requirement
that pollution control facilities be "non-revenue-producing" for
purposes of obtaining rate relief prior to their in-service dates; 128
and that West Penn Power had not established through its fivevolume compliance study that scrubbing three units at Harrison
29
represented the least-cost compliance option.
The administrative law judge found support for the commission's authority to enter a declaratory order; 3 0 recommended
against a rate surcharge for current recovery of a portion of the
company's CAAA compliance costs; I3 ' and determined that the

proposed compliance plan met the applicable standards for
32

prudence. '

125. Petition of West Penn Power Company Before the Pennsylvania Public
Utilities Commission (1991) (No. P-51051 1).
126. Petition of West Penn Power Company Before the Pennsylvania Public
Utilities Commission (1991) (No. P-910512).
127. Brief of the Office of Trial Staff Before the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission at 8-17, Pennsylvania P.U.C. v. West Penn Power Co. (1991)
(Nos. P-91051 1, P-910512) (arguing that Pennsylvania PUC had not been delegated express authority to pre-approve a utility CAAA compliance plan under
Pennsylvania Public Utility Code, 66 PA. C. S. 101 et seq.)
128. Brief of the Allegheny Ludlum Corporation Before the Pennsylvania
Public Utilities Commission at 11-19, Allegheny Ludlum v. West Penn Power
Co. (1991) (Nos. P-910511 & P-910512).
129. Brief of the Office of Consumer Advocate Before the Pennsylvania
Public Utilities Commission at 10-29 (1991) (Nos. P-910511 & P-910512).
130. Recommended Decision, supra note 124, at 42-48 (relying in part on
66 PA. C. S. 331(f), providing that the commission may issue declaratory order
to terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty).
131. Id. at 93. The administrative law judge accepted the arguments of various intervenors that 66 Pa. C.S. 1307(a), providing for a sliding scale of rates
and adjustments, can only be used as an expense recovery mechanism and cannot be used as a device to recover revenue requirements or a return on rate
base. The usual purpose of automatic adjustment clauses in Pennsylvania is limited to recovery of operating expenses such as state taxes, fuel costs, and the
like, and not expenditures that increase a company's rate base or provide a return on rate base. Id. at 80-82.
132. Id. at 57-60, 98 (citing, inter alia, Pennsylvania Public Util. Comm'n v.
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The potential value of the extension and bonus allowances
that West Penn could receive as a result of its scrubbing strategy
was noted by the administrative law judge, but did not provide
support for his recommended finding of prudence:
Scrubbing of the three units at Harrison makes APS
eligible to apply for up to 572,000 bonus and extension
allowances. ... If the allowances are.valued at $500 to
$1000 each, the benefit from the extension and bonus
allowances would amount to a net present value in 1995
dollars of $325 million to $650 million. If West Penn is
entitled to forty-two percent of these allowances (which
is roughly its ownership share in Harrison), that would
result in potential revenue of between $136 million and
$273 million.... Thus, if West Penn constructs the three
scrubbers and receives all of the bonus and extension allowances for which it may apply, and if the market price
for emission allowances is anything close to that which is
projected at the present time, sale of the allowances
would offset, at worst, almost fifty percent of the cost of
construction of the scrubbers. Should the market price
of the allowances be close to the high end of present estimates, sale of the allowances could offset the cost of the
scrubbers entirely.
...
Unless the Commission waits to see if APS can
win the EPA call-in derby, the Commission will not know
if West Penn will receive the extra allowances.... While
the federal government appears to have chosen to distribute bonus and extension allowances on the basis of
what amounts to a game of chance, it would be absurd to
declare a compliance strategy "prudent" which relied
upon the outcome of such a game. West Penn argues
that its scrubber compliance strategy is justified without
13 3
reliance upon the extension and bonus allowances.
As in West Virginia, a regulatory policy issue raised in Pennsylvania concerned the disposition of the potential revenues
Pennsylvania Power Co., 64 Pa. P.U.C. 308, 317 (1987): "Prudence is that standard of care which a reasonable person would be expected to exercise under the
same circumstances encountered by utility management at the time decisions had to
be made. In determining whether a judgment was prudently made, only those
facts available at the time judgment was exercised can be considered. Hindsight
review is impermissible." (emphasis in original)).
133. Id. at 53-56 (citations omitted).
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gained by the sale of bonus and emission allowances. West Penn
Power took the position in its filings that "to the extent that ratepayers share in [the cost of the scrubbers], they would share in
any allowance benefits to offset those costs when those allowances
are received."' 3 4 However, the administrative law judge had
noted at trial the possibility that "the Company might come back
and ask that the Commission allocate some of the excess value to
the stockholders," and West Penn Power agreed that such a re35
quest was possible.'
The recommended decision of the administrative law judge
reasoned that a prudence determination "would reduce the risk
to West Penn's investors, while shifting it, to a degree, to the ratepayers .... ,"136 The judge concluded that any excess benefit
from bonus or extension allowances should flow to the ratepayers, because "to rule otherwise would make pollution control
equipment both less risky and more profitable than generation
37
and distribution equipment."'
VI.

CONCLUSION

Initial state CAAA compliance proceedings underscore the
Byrd-Bond Amendment's potential for encouraging the use of
emission control technology during Phase I, and for achieving a
degree of deferred cost-sharing among states and utility systems
through the sale of emission allowances. The 3.5 million ton pool
of extension and bonus allowances is emerging as an important, if
uncertain, regulatory benefit both for utilities and for ratepayers.
Clearly, electric utilities faced with Phase I compliance decisions
cannot afford to overlook the potential economic value of the extension and bonus allowances to which they may be entitled
under section 404 of CAAA. This economic value may be realId. at 46 (citing West Penn St. 1 at 5).
Recommended Decision, supra note 124, at 48.
Id. at 50.
Id. The recommended decision reasoned that:
If West Penn receives the declaration which it seeks, the risk associated with investment in the scrubbers will be substantially reduced (albeit not eliminated), while at the same time West Penn will be
positioned to benefit financially should the allowance market develop in
such fashion that West Penn's excess allowances have considerable
monetary value. While the ratepayers will have paid for the scrubbers,
West Penn proposes to wait until a future date to determine whether
the ratepayers will receive any financial benefits which may accompany
the allowances over and above the cost of the scrubbers themselves.
Id. at 48-49.
134.
135.
136.
137.
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ized by the direct sale of allowances, or by banking allowances for
subsequent use and thereby delaying Phase II control actions.
The development of a private, pro rata allocation of the 3.5
million ton allowance pool following EPA's initial distribution of
these allowances in mid-1992 would encourage the widest dissemination of allowance benefits. By spreading the allowance
pool broadly, and taking advantage of the extremely high emission reduction potential of current and emerging control technologies, Phase I emission reductions could be concentrated at
several dozen plants rather than spread among all 111 plants
targeted for Phase I reductions.
The regional fairness of the Title IV acid rain control program will not be known until early in the next century. The emission allowance trading program for S02 emissions, at this point
the subject of proposed regulations in the FederalRegister, already
is being touted as a model for the control of carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases associated with global climate change.' 38
Utilizing market incentives for pollution control, as an abstract
economic concept, has broad appeal. However, previous efforts
by EPA to incorporate economic incentives within environmental
protection programs have had mixed success.' 39 Title IV of the
CAAA is a major gamble by Congress and the Bush Administration that economic incentives will prove more efficient in reducing pollution than traditional source-specific control programs.
The efficiency of Title IV emission allowance trading, and the
degree of interregional cost-sharing that it provides, will be measured in both financial and social terms as the program is implemented over the next decade. Direct utility compliance costs will
be relatively easy to determine. If the Byrd-Bond Amendment
achieves a substantial measure of employment protection for coal
miners and the communities that depend on the coal industry, as
its sponsors intended, the indirect social costs of Title IV should
be reduced. But if the allowance market disenfranchises scores of
coalfield communities, resulting social costs must be counted
against any direct utility cost savings achieved through the trading
138. See, e.g., W. Rees, Economics, Ecology, and the Limits of Conventional Analysis, 41 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. ASS'N 1323, 1324 (1991).
139. See D. Harrison, Economics' Contribution to the Environment, 41 J. AIR &
WASTE MGMT. ASS'N 1328, 1328-29 (1991); R. Hahn & G. Hester, Where Did All
the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG.

109, 151 (1989).
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program. This accounting could provide an acid test for the subsequent use of free-market principles in federal environmental
regulation.
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